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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that SSDs, which perform device-
level versioning, can be exposed to data tampering attacks
when the retention time of data is less than the malware’s
dwell time. To deal with that threat, we proposed SGX-SSD, a
SGX-based versioning SSD which selectively preserves file
history based on the given policy. The proposed system adopts
Intel SGX to implement the version policy management sys-
tem that is safe from high-privileged malware. Based on the
policy, only the necessary data is selectively preserved in SSD
that prevents files with less priority from wasting space and
also ensures the integrity of important files.
1 Introduction
Recently, malware corruption attacks are becoming more as-
tute, such as ransomware [10,11,22,27] and wiper [2,7,16,31].
Most of them use the latest exploit techniques to escalate priv-
ilege [6] and compromise the system [21, 22, 25]. Moreover,
to eliminate the possibility of data restoration, they neutralize
the existing software-based backup system by performing
attacks aiming the software backup device that is connected
locally or remotely [13, 14, 22].
To overcome this problem, recent studies have moved their
attention from the host side software-based backup system,
which can be compromised, to safely versioning the data in-
side a device [3, 15, 23, 26, 32]. These studies commonly pro-
tect the integrity of data by retaining the past version of data
inside SSD1. Since SSD firmware is isolated from the host,
compromising the versioning system inside SSD is almost im-
possible even though malware escalates its privilege [15, 32].
Project Almanac [32] is a state-of-art versioning SSD that
preserves all the data updated by a user for a certain period.
However, Project Almanac has a critical security issue. To
explain this problem in a more comprehensive way, we define
the terms pertaining to versioning in Table 1. In Project Al-
manac, every data page shares the same Retention Time(RT).
Thus, when the RT value is altered by Project Almanac, all
pages will get the newly defined RT value. Since every page
has the same RT value, important files and less important files
1In this paper, this device is called a versioning SSD.
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Figure 1: Global Dwell Time Distribution of Malware [12].
will have the same RT, which is a limitation of the system. Too
high RT value leads to higher space overhead due to version-
ing, while too low RT value introduces a risk of data integrity
violation by malware. Project Almanac can dynamically con-
trol the RT by the predefined algorithm, while guaranteeing
at least 3 days of RT to prevent data retention time from be-
coming too short. When SSD lacks of space due to too many
old versions (OV), Project Almanac implements the retrieving
mechanism that reclaims the older ones.
Figure 1 shows the statistical distribution of malware Dwell
Time (DT). As shown in the graph, over 50% of attacks have
60 days or longer DT. In Project Almanac, however, data in-
tegrity is not guaranteed if DT is greater than RT. For instance,
malware can execute a Delayed Attack2. Assume that ran-
somware successfully evades detection and breaks into a host
system, and encrypts the data that has 3 days of RT. After-
ward, malware can circumvent detection and stay for 4 days
(DT=4days). During that time, when the user requests to read
the data, it deceives the user by decrypting the encrypted data
and handing it over to the user. At the 4th day, the user will
realize the lost data, which is too late for the user, and request
data restoration to Project Almanac. However, since the origi-
nal data in Project Almanac is reclaimed due to expired RT,
there is no way for the user other than paying a ransom.
Main Idea: The essence of Project Almanac’s problem is
that the space consumption of the OV increases to provide
the same RT for all data. To mitigate this, the minimum RT
is set short, but the integrity of all data cannot be guaranteed
for malware with 3 days or longer DT. To solve this problem,
we propose SGX-SSD, which is a policy-based file versioning
2The Delayed Attack [33] is a data corruption attack that aims the data’s
OV to expire, which cannot be restored.
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Term Description
Retention Time (RT) Period to guarantee recovery after data becomes invalid
Dwell Time (DT)
The period of time between malware executing within
an environment and it being detected
Old Version (OV) Previous version of data that is preserved for recovery
Table 1: Definition of Terms for Versioning Systems.
SSD. In SSD firmware, rather than applying the same policy
to all files, the version policy is selectively applied to the
files based on the importance specified by the user. SGX-SSD
consists of following two important software/hardware com-
ponents(SPM, PV-SSD).
• SGX-based Secure Policy Manager(SPM): It is a SGX-
based policy manager for the safe policy management.
Trusted Communication Channel is implemented to safely
transfer user configurations to SSD.
• Policy-based File Versioning SSD(PV-SSD): SSD does not
have a file semantic inside. The policy-based file version-
ing SSD perceives the file semantic to perform file-based
versioning and restoration based on the policy.
SGX-SSD removes unnecessary waste of space that results
from preserving the history of low-priority files. By using the
secured space, it guarantees the integrity of important files by
preserving file history with safe policy.
2 Background
2.1 Intel SGX and Versioning SSD
Intel SGX [9] is an instruction set provided by Intel Pro-
cessor of Skylake or higher. Through the Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) called Enclave, SGX ensures the confi-
dentiality and integrity of applications even when the OS is
compromised. The software developer divides the applica-
tion into untrusted parts and enclave parts, and implements
the interface between the two parts. The untrusted part calls
the enclave through ECALL, and the enclave calls the un-
trusted part through OCALL. For using hardware resources,
since the enclave cannot directly call system calls, it should
execute OCALL first and request the untrusted part to call
the system call. Accordingly, when the OS is compromised,
there is a limitation that SGX cannot trust user inputs through
the user interface (UI). To overcome this, Aurora [19] uses
System Management Mode (SMM), another privileged mode
provided by the processor, to ensure secure I/O between the
enclave and UI.
A NAND flash-based SSD [8] logs user data to a physical
address in hardware. Since the SSD firmware is isolated from
the host system, privileged malware cannot read or tamper
with it [5, 15, 32]. In addition, it is less vulnerable from mal-
ware because it has a much smaller trusted computing base
(TCB) compared to the OS kernel and other software-based
solutions [15, 32]. Versioning SSDs [3, 15, 23, 26, 32] utilize
these characteristics of SSDs to perform safe versioning from
high-privileged malware attacks. In particular, by utilizing the
out-of-place update characteristics of the SSD, they create an
old version inside the SSD without additional copying, so no
additional device is required.
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Figure 2: Examples of Delayed Attack Scenarios.
2.2 Motivation: Integrity Vulnerability
When using a versioning SSD such as Project Almanac, the
user requests data recovery from the SSD only after malware
is detected. In this environment, if malware having DT longer
than the minimum RT of Project Almanac (default: 3 days)
invades the host system, Project Almanac can not guarantee
the integrity of the whole storage data. The reason is that at
the time of detecting the malware, the RT of the OV has already
expired, so the OV can not be recovered.
Figure 2(a) shows a scenario in which malware performs a
delayed attack in Project Almanac. Suppose secure.txt is
an important file to be protected by the user, and temp.txt is
a temporary file that does not need to be protected. Assume
that the malware’s DT is 4 days, and that Project Almanac’s
minimum RT is 3 days. In addition, it is assumed that the host
system has a high I/O intensity, so that the Project Almanac’s
RT converges to the minimum RT. Also, malware can inten-
tionally perform a lot of I/O to lower Project Almanac’s RT
value. The user creates files (secure.txt and temp.txt) on
3/1 in the Project Almanac environment and updates the files
on 3/2. At this point, the file data (V1) generated on 3/1 be-
comes the OV, and the newly updated data (V2) becomes valid
data. In 3/4, malware with a DT of 4 days invades the host
system and encrypts the files (secure.txt and temp.txt).
At this time, there are two OV (V1, V2) on the SSD, and the
data (V3) encrypted by malware becomes valid data. RT of
V1 ends at 3/5, and RT of V2 ends at 3/7, and V1 and V2 are
erased. The user detects malware at 3/8 and tries to recover
data. However, since the data (V1, V2) stored before the mal-
ware invasion does not remain on the SSD, both secure.txt
and temp.txt fail to be recovered.
Figure 2(b) describes a scenario where malware performs
a delayed attack in SGX-SSD. It is assumed that the user sets
the RT of the important secure.txt to 5 days, and RT is not
set in temp.txt because its importance is low. The user up-
dates the data with the flow described above, and the malware
attempts to encrypt it in the same way. At 3/8 when malware
is detected, the user requests data recovery. temp.txt can-
not be recovered because there is no OV. On the other hand,
secure.txt has RT of 5 days, and V2 has not yet expired.
Therefore, the user can recover secure.txt to the point in
time before the malware entered. In addition, on 3/8, Project
Almanac has two versions of secure.txt and temp.txt,
so there are a total of four OV. On the other hand, SGX-SSD
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does not have the OV of temp.txt, so it only has 2 OVs. This
shows that the space resources obtained by reducing the RT
of the less important file (temp.txt) can be used to protect
the important file (secure.txt) for a longer period.
The characteristic of Project Almanac is that it is an SSD
that preserves the state (State-Preserving SSD). The limitation
of this is that all blocks have the same RT. We aim to support
secure, selective file versioning that is not vulnerable to such
malware attacks.
3 Threat Model
Malware infiltrates the host system with software to obtain the
user, root, or highest privilege (ring-0 level). Malware aims
to delete or tamper with sensitive data of user. We exclude at-
tacks through physical access from our threat model. Against
the threat of malware, SGX-SSD guarantees the integrity of
the all old versions of data stored on disk based on the policy.
However, SGX-SSD does not guarantee the integrity of newly
updated data after malware infection. What we guarantee is
limited to pre-existed data that was updated to the disk before
malware infection. Through this, when the data is tampered
with, the user recovers the tampered files to the point in time
before the malware invades. Also, according to the policy, the
integrity of files that have already expired is not guaranteed.
Since the user recognizes this, one can allocate a policy with
sufficiently longer RT to protect data if the file is important.
Finally, since SGX and SSD each has a TEE and a very small
TCB, it is assumed to be safe from malware. Also, the user
trusts the vendor that distributes SGX-SSD, and assumes that
the user’s system is not infected with malicious code when
the user first installs SGX-SSD.
4 Design and Implementation
To design a secure policy-based versioning SSD even in a
compromised OS environment, we answer two questions:
• The user’s request inevitably passes through an untrusted
OS where the request can be tampered with by a man-in-
the-middle attack. How can we guarantee that the policy
request entered by the user is safely delivered to the SSD?
• SSD is a block device, so there is no file semantics, whereas
policies are assigned on a file-by-file basis. In order for the
SSD to perform policy-based versioning at the block level,
how can the SSD recognize the file semantics correspond-
ing to each block?
SGX-SSD is composed of software module called SGX-
based Security Policy Manager (SPM) and a hardware module
called Policy-based File Versioning SSD (PV-SSD). When the
vendor deploys SGX-SSD, the vendor hardcodes and hides the
unique device key (Kdev) in each module (SPM and PV-SSD
firmware). Kdev is a secret shared between two modules.
4.1 Policy Management via User Interface
In SGX-SSD, the versioning policy is a strategy on how to per-
form versioning on file data. This versioning policy consists
of configuration parameters (CP), which is policy informa-
tion, and a path of file to be managed based on the policy.
Especially, CP consists of Retention Time (RT), Backup Cycle
(BC), the maximum number of versions (V). In addition, defini-
tions of the terms used in the SGX-SSD and the mathematical
notations are shown in Table 2.
The user sets a new versioning policy in SGX-SSD in
the following steps. First, the user inputs the following
command in the console window (User Interface) to run
the SPM; $./sgx_ssd. Second, once SPM runs, the user
creates, changes or deletes the policy by typing the following
command; ${Policy Create|Change|Delete}{File
path}{retention time}{Backup cycle}{Number of
Version}. If the user newly wants to create a policy, the
user inputs the file path and CP to register with the policy.
Versioning of the file registered in the policy begins from the
time the user creates the policy. If the user wants to change
the policy, the user also inputs the file path and CP values.
The versioning policy of the file changes from the time user
changes the policy. If the user wants to delete the policy, the
user only inputs the file path. In this case, not only file itself
but also the old versions of the file registered in the policy are
deleted. At this time, the OV of the file registered in the policy
is deleted along with the policy. The user can recover files to
a certain time or a certain version by using SGX-SSD recovery
tool. The user inputs the following command to console;
$./recovery_tool {file path}{Time|Version}.
4.2 SGX-based Policy Manager
Figure 3 shows the overall design and operational flow of
SGX-SSD. The user sets the file policy through the control
path. SPM safely delivers the user’s versioning policy from UI
to the enclave by using the approach provided by Aurora [19].
First, when the user runs SPM, the SPM suspends the OS and
switches to the SMM. The SMM process receives the ver-
sioning policy (P( f j)) of the file ( f j) from the user through
Notation Description
Kdev Private key shared by SPM and PV-SSD.
f j File to apply the policy.
P( f j) The policy setting value entered by user. It consists of
the command type (CREATE, CHANGE, DELETE), the file
path of f j , and CP (CP is NULL when the command type
is DELETE.).
pbSet( f j) Piggyback set sent by the file system. It consists of the
file path of f j and the offset corresponding to data block.
R(P( f j )) A response message that PV-SSD sends to SPM. If the
request is successful, a success message (SUCCESS) is
sent, and if it fails, an error code is sent.
rec( f j) Message that the recovery tool sends to PV-SSD to re-
quest recovery. The file path and the list of all LBAs
belonging to f j, a certain time (T) or the version (V) to
rollback are included. If the LBA list of rec( f j) is NULL,
PV-SSD exhaustively searches all physical pages to re-
store the file.
MACK(M) Generate Message Authentication Code (MAC) gener-
ated from message (M) using key (K)
EK(M) Encrypt the message (M) using Key (K)
DK(M) Decrypt the message (M) using Key (K)
Table 2: Notation for SGX-SSD.
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Figure 3: An Overview of SGX-SSD.
the keyboard. Since the OS is suspended, even privileged
malware cannot interfere with this procedure. After the user
input is finished, the user input (P( f j)) is safely transmitted
to the enclave through a secure session implemented in ad-
vance between the SMM process and the SPM enclave. SPM
enclave encrypts P( f j) by using Kdev and generates the MAC
(MACKdev (EKdev (P( f j)))). The generated message (EKdev (P( f j)),
MACKdev (EKdev (P( f j)))) is sent to PV-SSD. The Policy Manage-
ment (PM) module operating inside PV-SSD decrypts the mes-
sage and verifies its integrity using Kdev to retrieve P( f j). Once
the policy update ends, PM encrypts the response (R(P( f j))), gen-
erates the MAC (MACKdev (EKdev (R(P( f j)))), and sends the mes-
sage (EKdev(R(P( f j))), MACKdev(EKdev(R(P( f j))))) to SPM. SPM
uses Kdev to decrypt and verifies the response (R(P( f j))).
4.3 File System Modification
The user performs I/O via data path (Refer to Figure 3).
SGX-SSD is designed to utilize existing native file system for
allowing various applications to perform I/O transparently. At
the same time, because PV-SSD does not know file semantic,
so SGX-SSD designs piggyback transfer in a way that makes
PV-SSD aware of file-level policy. When writing a file, the
file system sends a block I/O request to the block layer of
the OS. When the file system requests block I/O, file system
piggybacks pbSet( f j) (Refer to Table 2) into the data block.
The file path in the pbSet( f j) serves as an index for policy ref-
erence, and the file offset in the pbSet( f j) is referenced during
recovery. This part is described in detail in Section 4.4. By
using piggyback transfer, the versioning information of the
file for the block is transferred to PV-SSD.
4.4 Policy-based File Versioning SSD
Policy Management Policy Management (PM) consists of
three modules: (i) policy verifier, (ii) request handler, and (iii)
policy manager. When PV-SSD receives SPM requests, (i) it
verifies the message by comparing the MAC value using Kdev
to determine whether the request came from trusted SPM or
not. Once the verification succeeds, (ii) it parses the message
and extracts P( f j). (iii) It creates, changes or deletes the policy
metadata according to the policy command type in P( f j). The
policy metadata is a hash table that is used to search for a
policy entry by a file path value. A policy entry stores the
file path and CP. When updating policy metadata, CP and
file path in P( f j) is inserted into the policy entry. The policy
metadata is referenced by Selective Versioning (SV) module
during Garbage Collection [8, 17].
Version Mapping As explained in Section 4.3, a data
block piggybacked by the file system and pbSet( f j) are trans-
ferred to Version Mapping (VM). VM has three roles: (i)
parsing the piggyback set (pbSet( f j)), (ii) recording out-of-
band (OOB) region [32], and (iii) recording Version Valid-
ity Bitmap (VVB). VVB is a bitmap implemented in PV-SSD
DRAM that indicates whether each physical page should be
reclaimed or preserved. A page should be preserved if the
page contains OV. When receiving the data written by the
user, the VM parses the file path of f j and the offset of the
data block from pbSet( f j). When writing data to a NAND
physical page, pbSet( f j) is recorded in the OOB region of a
physical page [32]. Additionally, like Project Almanac, Logi-
cal Page Address (LPA), Written Time (WT), and Back Pointer
(BP) – linked to the physical page where the previous version
is recorded – are recorded in the OOB. On the other hand,
if there is no pbSet( f j) in the incoming data, nothing is writ-
ten to the OOB except LPA. In this case, there is no policy
corresponding to the page, so versioning is not performed.
The VM sets the VVB bit of the page to 1 if there is a policy
corresponding to the page. VM resets VVB bit of the page to 0,
if otherwise.
Selective Versioning The PV-SSD selects a victim block
in a greedy manner during the Garbage Collection (GC). Then,
in order to erase the victim block, the PV-SSD checks the state
of each page. If a page is in valid state, this page should be
copied to another free block. On the other hand, if the page
is not valid, the page can have two state: Invalid Page and
Old Version Page (OV Page). Here, the OV Page is the page
containing the OV, so the policy-based versioning should be
performed. The main purpose of Selective Versioning (SV)
is to differentiate Invalid Page and OV Page to selectively
preserve only OV. First, SV checks VVB to see if there is a
policy corresponding to the page. If there is no policy, the
page is not required to be preserved, so it is considered as a
Invalid Page and reclaimed during GC. On the other hand,
even if there is a corresponding policy of the page, it does
not always mean that this page should be preserved. This is
because the page may have expired according to the policy.
Finally, according to CP recorded in the policy entry, PV-SSD
determines whether versioning is required or not. If the policy
of the page has expired, PV-SSD resets VVB bits corresponding
to the page to 0 and reclaims the page. Otherwise, PV-SSD
regards it as OV Page.
4.5 Rollback Operation
The user can perform roll-back to a file to a certain time or a
version by using the recovery tool. The recovery tool receives
the file path of the target file ( f j) and the time (T) or the ver-
sion (V) to restore from the user. Then, the recovery tool uses
the ioctl() command to load the LBA list of f j from the
file system. It sends rec( f j) (Refer to Table 2) received from
the user and the file system to the PV-SSD to request recov-
ery of the file ( f j). By using the LBA list of rec( f j), PV-SSD
finds logical pages corresponding to the file contents. Then
PV-SSD navigates the page chain [32] associated with each
4
Disk Attack
Attack Scenario Description
(1) File Attack Malware attacks to tamper with users’ importantfiles.
(2) Policy Deletion Attack
The malware inserts the DELETE command to P( f j)
and sends P( f j) to the PV-SSD to request policy
deletion.
(3) Version Attack Malware wears out the version of a file with con-tinuous overwrites.
(4) File System Corruption Malware corrupts the file system.
Man-in-the-middle Attack
Attack Scenario Description
(5) Contents, LBA Tamper-
ing Attack
Malware tampers with the contents of the LBA of
the data block that the user has requested to write.
(6) Piggyback Set Deletion
The malicious code deletes the pbSet( f j) sent dur-
ing I / O so that the PV-SSD misunderstands that
there is no policy corresponding to the data block.
Table 3: Attack Scenarios in SGX-SSD.
LPN to explore the OV Page to be recovered. When all pages
corresponding to the file contents are found, those pages are
rearranged in the order of the offset recorded in the OOB area
to recover the file contents. When the restored file contents
are transferred to the recovery tool, it overwrites the contents
with the new file to complete recovery. If the file system is
corrupted by malware (including file metadata), the recovery
tool cannot send the LBA list. In this case, PV-SSD searches
all physical pages and compares the file path of rec( f j) with
file path written in each page’s OOB to find all corresponding
LPAs to the file ( f j). Then it recovers the file in the same
way as described above. In this case, it takes more time to
recover, but it is possible to recover files even the file system
is damaged.
5 Security and Performance Evaluation
Security Analysis In SGX-SSD, we analyze various attack
scenarios that ring-0 level malware can attempt. Malware
attacks that compromise a host system are largely divided
into two categories: (i) disk attack and (ii) man-in-the-middle
attack. (i) means that the malware directly tampers with data
that is persistently stored on the disk. On the other hand, (ii)
means that the malware installs a malicious module in the
kernel to falsify the message that the host server sends to the
PV-SSD. Table 3 describes various attack scenarios for each
category. (1) is a basic attack of ransomware. When (1) occurs,
PV-SSD recovers the tampered file to the point in time before
the malware invades. In the case of (2), PV-SSD verifies P( f j)
using Kdev and denies the request. We leave the defense of
(3) at the user’s discretion. When the file priority is high, the
user selectively protects the important files by not limiting the
number of versions. To recover the file under condition (4),
PV-SSD searches whole physical pages, finds the pages that
match with the file, reassembles them into the file, and sends
it to the recovery tool. Therefore, even in extreme situations
where the file system is completely corrupted, it is possible
to recover files by connecting the PV-SSD to another server.
When (5) or (6) occurs, PV-SSD cannot guarantee the integrity
of newly updated data after malware intrusion. However, since
no man-in-the-middle attack has occurred for pre-existing
data before malware invades, the file is recovered to the point
before the malware invaded.
System Configuration
Host System Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700 CPU @ 3.70GHz with 16 GB RAM
Kernel Version Linux 4.10.16
SSD Jasmine OpenSSD, Write/Read Throughput: 65MB/s,225MB/s
Table 4: Testbed Configurations for SGX-SSD.
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Performance Analysis For the experiment, we proto-
typed PV-SSD using Jasmine OpenSSD [20] described in Ta-
ble 4, and implemented the piggyback transfer mechanism
by modifying the VFS and driver code of the kernel. In order
to induce GC in the experiment, we designated the SSD as
the only partition available for 1 GB, and initialized all pages
to Invalid Page before each experiment. We measured the
overwriting performance of synthetic Big (20MB) and small
(32KB) file workloads (Workload(B) and Workload(S) re-
spectively) for performance comparison according to GC
overhead. In particular, the RT of each data was fixed at 3
days, so that our results do not include the overhead of re-
claiming the versioning data during the experiment period.
In Figure 4(a)(b), we observe that SGX-SSD maintains
higher performance than Project Almanac. Project Almanac
performs versioning for all data because RT of every data is
same. On the other hand, SGX-SSD selectively performs file
versioning. That is, in SGX-SSD, only versioning of important
data is performed, so write amplification is much less than
Project Almanac. The areas marked as A and B in Figure 4
show the spatial location of SGX-SSD and Project Almanac in
performance. In Figure 4(b), Workload(S) lowers the internal
GC efficiency of SSD than Workload(B), so overall through-
put is low. This is because, in the case of Workload(S), OV
Page and Invalid Page are mixed and distributed in the
same block, thereby increasing GC overhead. In particular,
Project Almanac rapidly decreases in performance as capacity
ratio and versioning ratio increase, while SGX-SSD decreases
at moderate speed.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the existing state-preserving stor-
age’s vulnerability that integrity cannot be guaranteed from
malware with long dwell time due to short retention time. To
solve the data integrity problem, we propose a policy-based
file versioning storage system (SGX-SSD). Through security
and performance analysis, we proved that SGX-SSD solves
the existing security problems mentioned earlier and has low
performance degradation due to versioning.
5
7 Discussion Topics
We would like to hear from reviewers about the following
questions.
Hardware Vulnerability Currently, in order to deploy
SGX-SSD, the Intel CPU with Skylake or higher that provides
SGX is required, and firmware modification of the SSD is
required. We also assume SGX and the SSD are trusted. How-
ever, the problem of vulnerability in SGX and the SSD con-
tinues to be raised [5, 29, 30]. SGX-SSD assumes that the SSD
has a timer. However, there is no trusted timer in SSDs on the
market. This is a potential security flaw in SGX-SSD as well
as various versioning SSDs ( [15, 32]).
Challenge We have chosen a design where users set poli-
cies based on the importance of the files. But, since there are
so many files, is it the right design approach to pass all of
these choices to the user? Currently, we use the technology
of piggyback in the OS for security stability. However, the
VFS and driver code of the OS need to be modified. We are
wondering if it will be a problem to commercialize when
OS modification is needed for security. Unlike the existing
backup software [1,4,28], SGX-SSD performs versioning on a
single device, so it is impossible to cope with situations such
as device failure [24]. Couldn’t it provide better security by
combining the characteristics of SGX-SSD that protects data
from high-privilege malware with existing backup software?
Currently, SGX-SSD is designed in a stand-alone mode. Can
we expand our design and apply it to a remote storage envi-
ronment where multiple users share the storage? If applicable,
what design should be added? Should SGX-SSD authenticate
multiple users by itself? How should each user be authorized
to set up a policy and how much space should be allocated
for versioning for that user?
Originality Pesos [18] is the access-control-based object
storage and provides richer policy than SGX-SSD. However,
the security scope of Pesos is limited to remote servers, and
assumes that the client system is trusted. Therefore, data can-
not be protected when malware enters the client machine.
Inuksuk [33] uses Intel TXT and self-encryption disk (SED)
to protect data by copying it to a protected partition. Inuksuk,
like SGX-SSD, can selectively protect files in the disk. How-
ever, Inuksuk has a very large overhead of backing up data to
a protected partition (e.g. 23.38 seconds to back up 85.6MB
of JPG files [33]), and the whole system is interrupted while
data is being backed up. Due to the long system downtime
problem, Inuksuk is unable to back up data in real time, and
the size of the files to be backed up and the backup cycle is
limited. In particular, in the client-server model, where ser-
vice interruption is very sensitive, an Inuksuk server must
be additionally deployed to prevent service interruption. On
the other hand, SGX-SSD not only performs host service and
PV-SSD’s versioning at the same time, but also has very little
overhead caused by versioning.
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